Social Cash Transfer Programme
Explore corruption risks and implementation vulnerabilities identified in TI-Z's 2025 assessment of Zambia's Social Cash Transfer Programme.
Payments to deputies of deceased beneficiaries carried the highest national risk.
The assessment rated this corruption risk at 61.6%, placing it in the high band. Payment delays followed at 59.4%, a moderate programme vulnerability.
SCT budget allocation, 2020-2026
The allocation rose from K1.05 billion in 2020 to K8.27 billion in 2025; the report records K7.65 billion for 2026.
Corruption risks and programme vulnerabilities
Where assessed risks were most pronounced
Choose a metric to compare risk and vulnerability ratings across the 12 survey districts.
Compare all sampled districts
National assessment results
| Risk or vulnerability | Type | Rating | Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inclusion of wrong beneficiaries | Programme vulnerability | 24.1% | Low |
| Payment of money to wrong beneficiaries | Programme vulnerability | 16.2% | Very Low |
| Failure to declare that beneficiaries have died | Corruption risk | 48.9% | Moderate |
| Payment to deputies of deceased beneficiaries | Corruption risk | 61.6% | High |
| Theft of money from beneficiaries after payment | Corruption risk | 39.6% | Low |
| Delays in making payments to beneficiaries | Programme vulnerability | 59.4% | Moderate |
Kalumbila and Solwezi
Key informants described both the gains from electronic payments and the integrity risks created by selection pressure, deputy access and uneven digital infrastructure.
Community-level selection created openings for bribery, impersonation and political influence where beneficiary lists were not transparently finalised.
Some digitally literate relatives or deputies controlled accounts, charged commissions or transferred funds without the beneficiary's consent.
Limited phones, network coverage, cash-out points and digital literacy created payment and complaint-handling barriers.
Differences between mobile money operators contributed to inconsistent payment dates, delays and limited explanations at district level.
Recommendations from TI-Z
Adapt payment channels to district network coverage, cash access points and each beneficiary's technological capacity and literacy.
Improve coordination across mobile network operators and integrate district stakeholders to reduce delays and strengthen complaint handling.
Consistently provide allowances and identification documents for CWAC and ACC volunteers, including support for transport and logistics.
The Anti-Corruption Commission, civil society and the Office of the Auditor General should intensify prevention and oversight of SCT and similar programmes.
Assessment scope and method
TI-Z surveyed 632 programme stakeholders in 12 districts and calculated weighted average risk and vulnerability ratings. It also conducted 19 key informant interviews in Kalumbila and Solwezi in October 2025 and reviewed documentary evidence.
Interpretation: R denotes a corruption risk and V denotes a programme vulnerability. Bands are Very low (0-20), Low (21-40), Moderate (41-60), High (61-80), and Very high (81-100).
Source: Transparency International Zambia, 2025 Corruption Risks Assessment on the Implementation of the Social Cash Transfer Programme in Zambia (2026).